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THE CONNECTICUT
BIRTH CONTROL BAN
AND PUBLIC MORALS
RicHARD J. REGAN, S.J.*

O

23, 1960, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review
on appeal the constitutionality of the Connecticut legislation which
bans the sale, prescription or use of contraceptives.' Not since 1952,
when the Court resolved the explosive problem of released time for the
religious instruction of public school pupils, 2 has the Court considered an
issue so emotion-packed for Americans of different religious and ethical
persuasions. Just how this case reached the Supreme Court and what
central issues are raised by the appeal will be described here.
Two years ago, Dr. C. Lee Buxton and several of his patients, residents
of New Haven, petitioned the courts of Connecticut to declare the birth
control ban void. When the case reached the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Chief Justice Raymond E. Baldwin, speaking for a unanimous
court on December 8, 1959, rejected the plea of Dr. Buxton and his
patients. 3 Immediately following this decision, the plaintiffs appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, and this spring the Supreme Court
agreed to review the case.
Dr. Buxton, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology and Chairman
of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Yale University
School of Medicine, claims that the general statutes of Connecticut
prevent him from giving his patients counsel on contraceptives. Specifically, the pertinent statute provides:
N MAY

Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars
or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both
4
fined and imprisoned.

*LL.B., Harvard Law School. First year theologian, Woodstock College.
1 Buxton v. Uliman, 362 U.S. 987 (1960).

2 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
8 Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 156 A.2d 508 (1959).
4 CoNN. GEN. STAT. §53-32 (1958).

7
Another section adds:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any Offense may be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principal
offender.5
These statutes, Dr. Buxton avers, keep him
from fulfilling his professional duty of giving
his patients the safest and best founded
prescriptions of medical science. Sixty-six
deans and doctors from the nation's medical
schools have filed a brief in support of Dr.
Buxton's plea.
Joined with Dr. Buxton in the action before the Supreme Court are several of his
patients, who for the sake of anonymity
have employed fictitious names. Mrs. Jane
Doe, twenty-five years old, barely survived
a difficult pregnancy. The result was a stillborn child and partial paralysis for Mrs.
Doe, who now seeks from Dr. Buxton advice
on how to lead a "normal married life"
without seriously endangering her health.
Since, in her view, Dr. Buxton can give this
advice but is prevented from doing so by
the Connecticut law, she claims that the law
unreasonably abridges her right to marital
relations without serious risk to life.
Another patient, Mrs. Pauline Poe,
twenty-six years old, has given birth to
three abnormal children. Although the underlying mechanism is as yet unclear, Dr.
Buxton and other consultant specialists
suspect a genetic cause. Mr. and Mrs. Poe
are upset at their prospects of future children and now seek advice from Dr. Buxton
on how to enjoy marital relations without
fear of conceiving abnormal children. As a
result of the Connecticut law, Mr. and Mrs.
Poe claim, Dr. Buxton is prevented from
giving this advice and thus the law unrea5

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§54-196 (1958).
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sonably restricts their right to marital intercourse without fear of conceiving abnormal
children.
On the one hand, Dr. Buxton claims the
right under certain circumstances to give
professional counsel on contraceptives and,
on the other hand, his patients claim the
right under the same conditions to receive
and follow this counsel. Yet, as Chief Justice
Baldwin observed, there is essentially no
real difference in the nature of the rights
claimed by doctor and patients. The doctor's
right to give counsel on contraceptives is
clearly dependent on the patient's right to
follow the counsel.
Whether the Connecticut legislation completely circumscribes the advice of doctors
to their patients on contraceptives is quite
doubtful. Resident doctors who simply disclose the findings of medical science on
contraceptives as a matter of information,
rather than counsel their use as a matter of
prescription, cannot be considered accessories to subsequent violations of the law
on their patient's own initiative. Nor is it
clear just how many residents find the Connecticut legislation a barrier to the practice
of birth control. As a matter of common
knowledge, the dominant pattern of contemporary American sexual mores does not
change abruptly at the borders of the state
of Connecticut. There is no indication that
Connecticut enforces, or even could enforce, the ban on the use of contraceptives.
Couples who practice artificial birth control
may purchase contraceptives in or from
neighboring states. Thus, the observer cannot avoid the conclusion that the significance of this plea of Dr. Buxton and his
patients is in large measure symbolic.
Yet, controversies over symbols very
often are fought more bitterly than controversies over realities. Despite almost yearly
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attempts in the last twenty years to induce
the legislature to modify the ban, the practice of artificial birth control in Connecticut
by married couples remains a criminal act.
Those who believe the practice morally
justified resent the criminal stigma attached
to the practice by the Connecticut law, even
though actually unenforced. Frustrated by
the legislature's repeated refusal to modify
the law, they have turned to the courts in
the hope of relief. With this test case now
before the Supreme Court, the climax is at
hand.
The question put before the Court by this
case is whether the Connecticut birth control legislation is a reasonable exercise of
the state police power over the health,
safety, morals and welfare of citizens. Does
the Connecticut legislation unreasonably restrict the rights of Mrs. Doe and Mrs. Poe
to marital relations and the professional
right of Dr. Buxton to counsel his patients?
The key words, of course, are "reasonable"
and "unreasonable."
Dr. Buxton's patients claim that the right
to marry, including the right to marital relations, is a fundamental human right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against arbitrary state action. The Connecticut legislation, the patients further contend,
does arbitrarily restrict their rights to marital
relations. No doubt, strictly speaking, Connecticut does not deny the right of marital
relations to Mrs. Doe and Mrs. Poe. Rather,
Connecticut prohibits one mode of sexual
relations to the married and the unmarried
alike. As Chief Justice Baldwin pointed out,
the law gives Mrs. Doe and Mrs. Poe the
alternatives of marital intercourse with risks
or sexual abstinence. Nonetheless, given the
physical condition of Mrs. Doe and Mrs.
Poe, they have little real aliernative to at

least partial sexual abstinence, if they wish
to obey the law.
What reasonable basis, then, can Connecticut assign to this restriction on the
marital relations of Dr. Buxton's patients?
Attorneys for the plaintiffs contend that the
birth control legislation cannot reasonably
claim to combat promiscuity when the state
permits the prescription, sale and use of
contraceptive instruments to prevent disease. In fact, by a curious bit of legal legerdemain, Connecticut does permit as
prophylaxis what the state prohibits as
contraception. Yet, it is not contradictory
for the state to permit contraceptive practices specifically in order to prevent disease
and to prohibit the same practices under all
other conditions in order to combat promiscuity. Connecticut permits the prescription,
sale and use of contraceptive instruments
only as prophylactics. The state may still
seek to discourage sexual relations outside
of marriage by prohibiting contraception
under all other conditions.
But if the purpose of the law is to discourage sexual relations outside of marriage or to insure a stable or expanding
population, then plaintiffs' attorneys further
argue that with respect to Mrs. Doe and
Mrs. Poe the Connecticut law has "cast its
net too indiscriminately" and, to mix
metaphors, "burnt the house to roast the
pig." For, if the legislation is designed to
discourage sexual relations outside marriage, why should Connecticut forbid the
practice of artificial birth control to married
couples? And if the legislation is designed.
to insure a stable or expanding population,
why should Connecticut forbid the practice'
of artificial birth control to Mrs. Doe and,
Mrs. Poe, who have no apparent possibility of normal pregnancy or normal children?

7
Of necessity, legislators preparing remedies for dangers to the commonwealth must
look to the general and typical instance
rather than the particular and the unique.
Perhaps, then, Connecticut universally forbids the practice of contraception as a means
to prevent those evils which will be the general and typical results from the practice,
namely, the encouragement of promiscuity
and the threat to a stable population. If this
be the case, then Connecticut forbids the
practice of artificial birth control to Mrs.
Doe and Mrs. Poe simply because the general prohibition facilitates enforcement
against more typical abuses. Still, Mrs. Doe
and Mrs. Poe may wonder exactly how application of the birth control ban to them
helps enforce the law against the main evils
attributed to the practice of contraception.
But there is another more all-inclusive
reason for the Connecticut legislation which
is directly applicable to the cases of Mrs.
Doe and Mrs. Poe. The universality of the
ban on contraceptives clearly suggests that
the State of Connecticut seeks not only to
discourage illicit relations outside marriage
but to regulate sexual morals within marriage as well. Connecticut declares that the
practice of contraception as such, whether
outside marriage or not, constitutes a violation of public morals. In short, Connecticut
simply aims to exercise the general power
of a state to safeguard public, including domestic, morals.
Mrs. Doe and Mrs. Poe, of course, dispute the judgment of the legislature of Connecticut that their practice of contraception
would violate public morals. But here the
plaintiffs face the difficult task of persuading
the Court to overrule the judgment of Connecticut on the nature and extent of legislative protection of public morals. The
plaintiffs do not suggest that the Court rely
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on its own determination of the public morality of birth control in order to set aside
the Connecticut law as unreasonable. Legislatures and not courts, after all, are primarily entrusted with determining what
violates and how best to protect public
morals. Rather, the plaintiffs contend that
the Court should test the reasonableness of
legislative prescriptions of public morals by
contemporary community standards.
Hence, the plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the Connecticut legislation unreasonable because the most current religious and
ethical opinion- accepts the morality of birth
control by married couples and because
medical opinion today generally recommends the practice of birth control as physically safe and psychologically sound.
And yet, why should not the Court, even
following the test proposed by the plaintiffs,
accept the judgment of the legislature rather
than a survey of religious, ethical and medical opinion as the expression of contemporary community standards on this question
of public morals? And if, as the plaintiffs
assert, the community approves the morality of birth control by married couples,
then why should not the legislature rather
than the Court take the measure of this
popular sentiment?
The plaintiffs further intimate that the
Connecticut birth control ban is incompatible with the pluralistic principles of American democracy. For the Connecticut
legislation imposes the code of morality of
a particular belief on citizens of other religious and ethical persuasions. Catholics,
almost alone among religious and ethical
groups today, condemn contraception as an
immoral means of family planning and, in
the main, appear to support the present legislation. Yet, ironically enough, while many
Protestants currently seek to modify the
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birth control ban, the law owes its origin in
1879 to their own great-grandparents. In
any case, however, the Connecticut birth
control law is an expression of the popular
will by a legislative majority, not a minority.
Nor is it easy to see how any legislation on
a question of public morals, whether wise
or unwise for a pluralistic society, could fail
to impose the code of morality of some in
the community on others.
The issue between Dr. Buxton and his
patients on the one hand and the State of
Connecticut on the other is joined. Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs might have an easier time
persuading the Court of the unreasonableness of the Connecticut legislation if the
plaintiffs could show some circumscription
of freedom of conscience. First Amendment
rights, in fact if not in theory, have a preferential status in our democracy. Undoubtedly, too, the State of Connecticut might
have an easier time persuading the Court
of the reasonableness of its legislation if
the state could show some socio-economic
basis for the birth control ban in this case.
But the fundamental issue as related to
Dr. Buxton and his patients directly involves
neither the freedom of conscience of the
plaintiffs nor the economic good of society.
The fundamental issue here is the nature
and extent of the power of a state over
public morals. The implications of this issue
are far reaching. If the plaintiffs are successful here in persuading the Court that a state
has no power to prohibit the practice of
contraception by Mrs. Doe and Mrs. Poe,
then it is difficult to see how a state could
regulate other areas of public morals. Is the
legislative prohibition of acts by freely consenting adults reasonable only when the
acts prohibited as immoral invade the vested
rights of others or threaten society with
serious physical evil? If so, then could a

state prohibit homosexuality between consenting adults or even voluntary euthanasia
to incurably ill patients?
In essence, the question raised by this
case is whether a state may prohibit actions
simply because they seriously and adversely
affect community morals independently of
any injury to another, and of any threat of
physical evil to society. Aristotle expressed
the position of classical philosophy on the
formative function of legislation in the
moral education of citizens thusly:
Lawgivers make citizens good by developing in them habits of right action - this is
the goal of all legislation, and if it fails to
do this it is a failure .... 6
But for the modem libertarian heirs of
Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau,. political
freedom means the absolute freedom of the
autonomous individual, save what the individual must surrender to the state in order
to substitute peace for the "war of all against
all." Thus, law becomes simply the power to
insure peace, not virtue. Political freedom
becomes divorced from moral virtue and
political liberty from moral rectitude. There
is no room in this scheme of things for legislative participation in the moral formation
of citizens.
Of course, no state may legislate private
morality; whether seeking to protect health,
safety, welfare or morals, the area of the
state's legitimate competency is restricted to
what affects the community as a whole. Yet,
human activities are so interwoven that
scarcely any are without some measure of
social significance. We live in a human beehive and by our behavior each of us affects
others and the whole. The really difficult
problem is to determine to what degree and
with what result individual activities affect
0 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHics,

1103b, 3-5.
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the public interest. This in turn depends on
how widespread the activity and how bad
the effect.
The Connecticut birth control legislation,
so one objection runs, invades the privacy
of the marital bedroom. But this objection is
irrelevant to the proper question of how the
practice of contraception by individuals affects the community. However privately
enacted, an activity may still adversely affect the public interest. Connecticut has
judged that the danger to community morals
from the widespread practice of birth control is sufficient to justify the present legislation.7 Again, the Supreme Court confronts
the legislative evaluation of a factual situation.
Dr. Buxton and his patients contest the
power of a state to prohibit as a matter of
public morals the practice of artificial birth
control. But it is another question whether
the Connecticut birth control ban is wise
legislation. Not every legislative prescription of public morals within the power of
a state is a wise exercise of that power.
"Human law," as St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledged seven centuries ago, "cannot
An apposite case on this point is Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Constitution
of Kansas, adopted in 1880, prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Mugler
was convicted of manufacturing and selling beer.
On writ of error to the United States Supreme
Court, the appellant claimed in part that the
legislature had no right to prohibit any citizen
from manufacturing for his own use any article
7

not affecting the rights of others. Mr. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court, rejected this claim.
The entire scheme of prohibition might fail if
the right of each citizen to manufacture intoxicating liquors for his own use were recognized.
In other words, Mugler's activity, if imitated,
would affect the community's standards and practices. According to Mr. Justice Harlan, the
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prohibit everything which the natural law
prohibits." Rather, human law is a determination of practical reason which should
take full measure of the conditions of possibility, the weakness of human nature and
the living traditions of a people.
One practical difficulty with the Connecticut birth control ban is the impossibility of
enforcement. Since neighboring states permit the sale of contraceptives, Connecticut
cannot hope to prevent their use by married
couples. At best, the Connecticut legislation
serves only as a declaration of public policy;
at worst, legislation so widely disobeyed encourages disrespect for all law. In this
matter, Americans have only to recall the
legacy of national prohibition.
A second major objection to the wisdom
of the Connecticut birth control legislation
stems from the pluralistic character of the
American polity. Some accommodation
among citizens of different religious and
ethical beliefs on the legislative protection
of public morals is a necessary part of political wisdom. Harmony among citizens is
required for the common good. Of course,
such accommodation by the nature of things
is relative to time, place and subject matter.
Yet, in the case of artificial birth control,
practical reason may suggest that Connecticut modify its legislation. The minds of
many moderns, unaided by the authoritative instruction of the Church, do not conclude that artificial birth control in all
circumstances is immoral. So many conscientious non-Catholics believe the practice of birth control morally licit that the
present legislation, without any compensating hope of enforcement, may unjustifiably
(Continued on page 49)

Kansas legislature might reasonably conclude that

total prohibition was necessary to prevent the evils
of excessive drink.
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THEOLOGICA, I-I1, q. 96, art. 2, ad 3.

